The Node.Probe and Remote.do paths built outbound URLs by string-
formatting admin-controlled fields (Scheme/Address/Port/BasePath)
straight into requests, then dialed the result with the default
transport. CodeQL flagged this as go/request-forgery — an admin
(or anyone who compromises the admin account) could point a node
at internal infrastructure (cloud metadata, RFC1918 ranges, etc.)
and the panel would dutifully fetch it.
Add util/netsafe with a shared TOCTOU-safe DialContext that
resolves the host, rejects private/internal IPs unless the
per-request context whitelists them (per-node AllowPrivateAddress
flag, plumbed through context.Value), and dials the resolved IP
directly so the IP that passed the check is the IP we connect to.
This closes the DNS-rebinding window where a hostname could
resolve to a public IP at check time and a private one at dial.
Also tighten address validation (NormalizeHost rejects anything
that isn't a bare hostname or IP literal — no embedded paths,
userinfo, schemes) and switch URL construction from fmt.Sprintf to
url.URL{} + net.JoinHostPort so admin-supplied values can't smuggle
URL components.
custom_geo.go's isBlockedIP now delegates to netsafe so there's
one source of truth.
* [refactor] api controller
* [fix] access log path
better to not hardcode the access log path, maybe some ppl dont want to use the default ./access.log
* [fix] set select options from logs paths in xray settings
* [update] .gitignore
* [lint] all .go files
* [update] use status code for jsonMsg and 401 to unauthorize
* [update] handle response status code via axios
* [fix] set correct value if log paths is set to 'none'
we also use the default value for the paths if its set to none
* [fix] iplimit - only warning access log if f2b is installed
